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I estimate the eﬀect of U.S. government spending and tax shocks on Canada and the U.K.
from 1975 to 2014, and on Japan from 1979 to 2014. Spending and tax shocks are identiﬁed
using sign restrictions on the impulse responses from a vector autoregression (VAR). I ﬁnd
that spillover eﬀects of expansionary ﬁscal shocks are not uniform across countries, though
for all three countries they result in economically signiﬁcant GDP increases in the short run.
In addition, government spending shocks have larger eﬀects than net tax shocks. Altogether,
the results support the idea that some countries may beneﬁt signiﬁcantly from expansionary
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1 Introduction
In response to the global recession that began in late 2007, policy makers called for coor-
dinated ﬁscal responses, expressing a fear that spillover eﬀects would dilute the eﬀectiveness of
policies pursued in isolation and, implicitly, that some countries would free ride oﬀ of the diﬃ-
cult political decisions of others.1 Were these policy makers’ beliefs consistent with theoretical
predictions and empirical evidence? To date there is little empirical evidence on the magnitude
of ﬁscal policy spillovers, particularly for the United States. To the existing evidence I contribute
estimates of the spillover eﬀects of U.S. ﬁscal policy shocks on Canada and the U.K. from 1975
to 2014, and on Japan from 1979 to 2014.
I ﬁnd that while spillover eﬀects of expansionary ﬁscal shocks are not uniform across the
countries in my sample, for all three countries they result in economically signiﬁcant GDP in-
creases over some portion of the response horizon. For all three countries, government spending
shocks generally have larger eﬀects than net tax shocks. Altogether, the results support the idea
that some countries may beneﬁt signiﬁcantly from expansionary U.S. ﬁscal policy.
1.1 The Theoretical Basis for Spillovers
The United States economy is linked to the rest of the world through goods, factor, and
assets markets. The linkages are reﬂected in the ﬂows of goods and services in interna-
tional trade; in the relationships between goods and factor prices at home and abroad;
and in the asset pricing and capital ﬂow relationships between domestic and foreign
assets markets. Dornbusch and Fischer (1986).
Dornbusch and Fischer’s succinct description illustrates the channels through which U.S. ﬁscal
policy can spill over to the rest of the world. In the goods market, changes in government
spending can have a direct eﬀect on the trade balance if the government purchases foreign as
well as domestic goods. Fiscal policy can have indirect eﬀects on the trade balance if changes in
government spending and taxes aﬀect the private sector’s consumption decisions as well. To the
extent that domestic ﬁscal policies aﬀect domestic factor prices, such as wages, the relative price
levels between the U.S. and other countries should change, driving changes in the real exchange
rate and real interest rate diﬀerentials. These in turn may drive changes in the trade balance
1See, e.g., the speech by Dominique Struass-Kahn, former managing director of the IMF, at Oesterreichische
Nationalbank, Vienna, May 15, 2009, http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/051509.htm, and the “Declara-
tion of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy” (G20 Washington Summit), November 15, 2008,
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008declaration1115.html.
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and capital ﬂows between the U.S. and the rest of the world. Real interest rate diﬀerentials may
also change if ﬁscal policies have a direct eﬀect on the domestic interest rate.
A number of theoretical models have been developed to investigate the transmission of
ﬁscal policy shocks. The predictions of the models vary, however, based on their particular
structures and assumptions. In a basic undergraduate-textbook version of the Mundell-Fleming
model,2 with ﬁxed prices in the short run and ﬂexible exchange rates, a debt-ﬁnanced increase
in government spending or a net tax decrease boosts domestic GDP. The domestic real interest
rate increases, leading to a real exchange rate appreciation and, if the Marshall-Lerner condition
holds, a deterioration of the trade balance. Increased imports at home imply a boost to GDP
abroad. In the version of Frenkel and Razin (1996) — a two-country model — foreign output
and the domestic interest rate rise, but the eﬀects on the real exchange rate and trade balance
are ambiguous. The responses depend on the relative magnitudes of domestic and foreign
saving and import propensities, and the domestic and foreign elasticities of money demand with
respect to the interest rate and income.
A number of microfounded, dynamic, general equilibrium models have also been developed
that explicitly account for spillovers from ﬁscal policy. The predictions of these models vary
based on assumptions related to, among other things, the ﬁnancing of government expenditures,
the completeness of international asset markets, and substitutability between domestic and for-
eign goods. As a result, the only common prediction across most of these models is that an
increase in domestic government spending increases domestic and foreign output.3
Betts and Devereux (2001), for example, develop a model with incomplete markets where
the labor supply response to a balanced-budget expansion in domestic government spending
leads to an increase in domestic output. Foreign output initially increases as well because
of increased demand for foreign products. As prices adjust, however, an improvement in the
foreign country’s terms of trade generates a wealth eﬀect that lowers foreign labor supply, and
the increase in foreign output is reversed. The eﬀect on the real exchange rate depends on
whether exports are priced in domestic currency (no eﬀect) or foreign currency (a depreciation).
In more recent work, Corsetti and Müller (2013) specify a model with complete markets
where the government can ﬁnance consumption through either lump-sum taxes or debt. A
government spending shock increases domestic and foreign output relative to their steady-state
levels, though in both cases the eﬀect eventually reverses and output moves below the steady
2See, e.g., Mankiw (2010), appendix to chapter 12.
3For a counterexample, see Taugourdeau (2002) which features a two-country model with monopolistic compe-
tition in which expansionary ﬁscal shocks increase domestic output but decrease foreign output in the short run.
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state. The real exchange rate depreciates and the trade balance deteriorates, though again these
eﬀects eventually reverse.
1.2 Prior Empirical Evidence
Several recent papers have looked at the eﬀect of U.S. ﬁscal shocks on the U.S. real exchange
rate, terms of trade and the trade balance, though in each case they estimate the eﬀect relative
to an aggregate of other countries rather than the eﬀect on individual countries. Enders et al.
(2011), Monacelli and Perotti (2010), Kim and Roubini (2008) and Ravn et al. (2007) all ﬁnd that
increases in U.S. government spending or the primary budget deﬁcit lead to real exchange rate
depreciation. Enders et al. (2011) and Corsetti and Müller (2006) also ﬁnd that spending shocks
decrease the terms of trade. Kim and Roubini (2008) and Corsetti and Müller (2006) ﬁnd that
increases in the primary deﬁcit have a small but positive eﬀect on the current account or trade
balance, while Monacelli and Perotti (2010) and García-Solanes et al. (2011) ﬁnd a negative eﬀect
on the trade balance. Boileau and Normandin (2012), in a multi-country study including the
U.S., ﬁnd that U.S. tax cuts increase the external deﬁcit.
Arin and Koray (2009) and Canzoneri et al. (2003) are the closest to what I do here. Arin
and Koray (2009) estimate the eﬀect of U.S. ﬁscal shocks on Canadian GDP, the bilateral real
exchange rate, and Canadian and U.S. real short-term interest rates from 1961 to 2004. They
ﬁnd that U.S. government spending shocks have a negative eﬀect on Canadian GDP, while net
tax shocks do not have any signiﬁcant eﬀects. When their sample is restricted to 1973 through
2004 they ﬁnd that Canadian GDP ﬁrst increases in response to U.S. spending shocks, then
becomes negative after 16 quarters. The latter ﬁnding is consistent with my results, discussed in
detail below.
Canzoneri et al. (2003) estimate the eﬀect of U.S. ﬁscal shocks on GDP and the real eﬀective
exchange rate for the U.K., France and Italy from 1975 to 1999. They ﬁnd that U.S. government
spending increases lead to signiﬁcant and persistent increases in foreign GDP, while an increase
in net taxes has little to no eﬀect. Spending increases in the U.S. also cause signiﬁcant exchange
rate depreciations in France and the U.K., with no signiﬁcant eﬀect for Italy, while net tax
increases lead to signiﬁcant appreciations in the U.K. and Italy, with no signiﬁcant eﬀect for
France.
The introduction of the euro in 1999 and the resulting common monetary policy has mo-
tivated work on ﬁscal policy spillovers among euro-area countries. Beetsma et al. (2006) and
Giuliodori and Beetsma (2005) focus on international trade spillovers. Beetsma et al. (2006),
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using a sample of 14 countries, ﬁnd that domestic government spending increases and net tax
decreases signiﬁcantly increase imports from other euro area countries, with spending having
the larger impact. Giuliodori and Beetsma (2005) likewise ﬁnd that expansionary ﬁscal shocks
in France, Germany and Italy lead to signiﬁcant increases in imports from other euro area
countries.
2 VAR Speciﬁcation and Identiﬁcation
I estimate the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks using a vector autoregression (VAR) on quarterly data
from 1975:1 through 2014:3 for Canada and the U.K., and from 1979:1 to 2014:3 for Japan. The
baseline speciﬁcation for the VAR is of the form
xt =
p∑
j=1
Ajxt−j + ut, (1)
where xt is the vector of endogenous variables, Aj is the coeﬃcient matrix on lag j, ut is the
vector of reduced-form residuals and p is the lag length of the VAR. I start with a baseline
speciﬁcation that includes U.S. real government consumption and investment (gt), U.S. real net
taxes (tt), U.S. real GDP (yt), foreign real GDP (y∗t ), and the real bilateral trade balance (tbt).
Alternately, I include as a ﬁfth variable the real bilateral exchange rate (qt) and the ex-post
real short term interest rate diﬀerential (rt − r∗t ). U.S. net taxes are current tax and transfer
receipts net of transfer, subsidy and interest payments. All variables except the interest rate
diﬀerential are in natural logs and GDP, spending and net tax variables are per capita. The
VAR is estimated in levels, with four lags, a constant and a linear time trend.
2.1 Identiﬁcation
The residuals from an unrestricted VAR like (1) will, in general, be correlated across equa-
tions. As a result, the residuals from the equations for g and t cannot be interpreted as exogenous
ﬁscal shocks — some method must be used to recover the uncorrelated structural shocks from
the residuals. The relationship between the VAR residuals (ut) and the desired structural shocks
(εt) can be written as
ut = B εt, (2)
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where E[εtε′t] = I . Two popular methods for recovering structural shocks require imposing
speciﬁc restrictions on B.4
The ﬁrst method, originally suggested by Sims (1980), uses the Cholesky factorization of the
estimated residual covariance matrix (Σ̂u) for B.5 This imposes a recursive ordering in which
a shock to one variable has a contemporaneous eﬀect on variables following it in the ordering,
but no contemporaneous eﬀect on those preceding it. One problem with this approach is
technical: the impulse responses it generates may not be robust to alternate orderings of the
variables. So the eﬀect of changes in government spending on GDP, for example, may change
with the ordering of the variables. The larger the covariance between the residuals of the
model the more sensitive the results will be to reordering. Another problem is conceptual: the
contemporaneous eﬀects it identiﬁes may conﬂate discretionary policy responses with automatic
changes in government spending or net taxes over the business cycle. For example, government
transfers vary systematically over the business cycle by design and do not reﬂect discretionary
policy changes. Since changes in the net taxes variable indirectly capture changes in transfers,
the impulse responses to net tax shocks using a recursive identiﬁcation reﬂect more than just
responses to discretionary policy changes.
The second method, ﬁrst used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) in the ﬁscal policy context,
seeks to deal with the conceptual problem of Cholesky identiﬁcation by using external informa-
tion to identify the contemporaneous response of government spending and net taxes to changes
in output.6 They use this information to derive restrictions on B that have the eﬀect of isolating
discretionary policy responses. For government spending they ﬁnd no systematic response to
changes in output at a quarterly frequency. In addition, they assume that policy makers take at
least a quarter to make any discretionary changes in spending in response to changes in output.
As a result, unanticipated government spending shocks are just the residuals from the spending
equation in a VAR. This is equivalent to a recursive ordering with spending ordered before GDP.
For net taxes, they use OECD estimates of the elasticity of taxes and transfers to changes in
output to control for non-discretionary changes in net taxes. These estimates indicate a positive
4Another approach used in the ﬁscal policy literature does not identify ﬁscal policy shocks from measures of
total government spending. Instead, narrative measures of federal defense spending or tax changes are used as
instruments for government spending and taxes and included in a VAR. See Ramey (2011b) and Romer and Romer
(2010). In section 3.2 I compare my results to those obtained using these narrative approaches.
5The Cholesky factorization results in a lower triangular matrix P such that PP ′ = Σ̂u. In this case, then,
B = P−1. Among the studies cited above, Arin and Koray (2009), Corsetti and Müller (2006) and Kim and Roubini
(2008) use this method.
6Among the studies cited above, Canzoneri et al. (2003) and Monacelli and Perotti (2010) use this identiﬁcation
method.
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automatic response of net taxes to changes in GDP. Once the automatic response is controlled
for, Blanchard and Perotti ﬁnd a negative relationship between net taxes and GDP. A problem
with this approach is that the results may be sensitive to the particular estimates used to con-
trol for the automatic responses. These estimates are obtained from regressions and therefore
subject to estimation uncertainty which is not reﬂected in the resulting impulse responses.
2.2 Sign Restriction Methodology
In this paper I use the sign restriction approach of Mountford and Uhlig (2009) which avoids
the problems associated with the identiﬁcation methods above. The idea is to specify a minimal
number of assumptions on what the impulse responses should look like, ﬁnd a large number of
candidate B matrices that produce impulse responses that satisfy the restrictions, and calculate
point estimates as the median of the resulting distribution of impulse responses. The advantage
of this methodology over the recursive approach is that, like Blanchard and Perotti, I can specify
the restrictions in a way that isolates discretionary policy shocks. In addition, the results are not
dependent on the ordering of the variables. The advantage of this method over the Blanchard
and Perotti approach is that it allows me to deal with the same problems they were addressing
but in a more general way. Rather than specify a particular quantitative structural relationship a
priori based on uncertain estimates of contemporaneous correlations, I generate many candidate
structural relationships that share qualitative implications. This better accounts for the inherent
uncertainty of the estimates.
2.2.1 Specifying the Restrictions
As mentioned above, the key to identifying discretionary policy shocks is controlling for the
automatic response of spending and net taxes to changes in GDP. I accomplish this by following
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and ﬁrst identifying a “business cycle shock” which captures these
automatic responses and requiring government spending and net tax shocks to be orthogonal
to the business cycle shock. To identify a business cycle shock I make one critical assumption:
increases in U.S. net taxes do not cause increases in U.S. GDP; if output and tax revenue are
both increasing it must be the result of an improvement in the business cycle. Speciﬁcally, I
deﬁne a business cycle shock as a positive co-movement in the impulse responses of U.S. net
taxes and GDP for quarters zero through four. In addition, I require that the increase in net
taxes be greater than any change in government spending over the same time period. This
additional restriction is imposed to eliminate situations where the increase in GDP is itself the
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Table 1: Identifying Sign Restrictions
Business Cycle Gov’t Spending Net Tax
Shock Shock Shock
U.S. GDP (yt) +
Gov’t Spending (gt) gt < tt + gt < tt
Net Taxes (tt) + tt < gt +
Notes: This table shows the restrictions on the sign and relative magnitude of
impulse responses for each identiﬁed shock. The restrictions are imposed for
impact and the following four quarters.
result of an increase in government spending.
A “government spending shock” is deﬁned as increase in the impulse response of government
spending for quarters zero through four that is also orthogonal to a business cycle shock. In
certain draws that meet this restriction, it may also be the case that net taxes are decreasing
over the same horizon. This is a ﬁscal change that should have similar qualitative results as an
increase in government spending. As a result, for government spending shocks I also require that
the increase in government spending be greater in magnitude than any change in net taxes over
the same horizon. I deﬁne “net tax shocks” analogously: an increase in the impulse response
of net taxes for quarters zero through four that is orthogonal to a business cycle shock and
which is greater than any change in government spending over the same horizon. Government
spending and net tax shocks must also be mutually orthogonal. No restrictions are placed on
the impulse responses of any of the other variables in the system. A summary of the identifying
sign restrictions is provided in Table 1.
2.2.2 Potential Problems with the Methodology
Fry and Pagan (2007) and Fry and Pagan (2011) identify and discuss two potential problems
when using the sign restriction methodology: the “multiple shocks problem” and the “multiple
models problem.” The multiple shocks problem arises when a set of responses could have been
generated by more than one potential shock; not enough information is speciﬁed to discriminate
between the potential shocks. An example of this in my case is a shock which produces an
increase in all of GDP, net taxes, and government spending. With only restrictions on the
sign of the impulse responses this could be identiﬁed as either a business cycle or government
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spending shock. As described above, I impose additional restrictions on the relative magnitude
of the responses to deal with this problem.
The multiple models problem arises from the fact that each set of impulse responses repre-
sents a diﬀerent model of the relationship between the variables in the VAR. One way to present
my results would be, for example, to provide the median response of foreign GDP to an iden-
tiﬁed net tax shock, calculating the median with reference to the range of responses of foreign
GDP only. Then I could give the median response of the interest rate diﬀerential, calculating the
median with reference to the range of responses of the interest rate diﬀerential only, and so on
for the other variables. The problem with this approach is that if I consider the response of each
variable in isolation, there is no reason to expect that all of the median responses are generated
by the same matrix B. The result for each variable will likely be coming from a diﬀerent model.
To deal with this, Fry and Pagan (2007) suggest presenting the set of median responses that are
“closest” to the median calculated across all candidate responses that meet the restrictions.
I generated candidate matrices as described in Appendix A, below, until I had 1000 that
each contained a business cycle, government spending and net tax shock identiﬁed using the
restrictions discussed above. To deal with the multiple models problem, for each set of responses
that met the criteria I summed the squared, standardized diﬀerence of each variable’s response
from the median response of that variable across all candidates. The candidate matrix B whose
responses had the lowest overall deviation from the median was used to generate the results I
present here.
3 Results
Graphs of the impulse responses to a positive government spending shock and a positive
net tax shock are given in Figures 1 through 3. Tables 2 and 3 provide more detailed numerical
results for the spillover variables. The solid-line point estimates are the median values across
the identiﬁed responses. The dashed lines in the ﬁgures are 90% bootstrap conﬁdence intervals
constructed using the structural matrix that resulted in the median responses.
3.1 Results for the Foreign and Domestic Variables
Figure 1 shows the estimated shocks and the response of U.S. GDP to each. The identiﬁed
shocks are normalized to equal a 1% increase in government spending or net taxes, respectively,
at the time of the shock. The eﬀect of spending shocks on the level of spending and net tax
9
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Figure 1: Response of U.S. variables to a positive 1% shock to Spending and Net Taxes.
shocks on the level of net taxes are both persistent, with each remaining positive for most of the
response horizon. Government spending shows a reversal around 18 quarters after the shock.
Increases in government spending have a positive eﬀect on U.S. GDP, with a 1% increase in
spending leading to a peak eﬀect of 0.49% of GDP on impact. In dollar terms, measured at the
mean of each series, this implies a multiplier of around 2.2. In a recent review of the literature
on ﬁscal policy multipliers, Ramey (2011a) reports a range of estimates between 0.3 and 3.8,
varying by speciﬁcation, sample, and identiﬁcation method. My result is on the high side of
most estimates from linear VARs, although the studies Ramey surveys all have samples ending
no later than 2008. They therefore do not include the eﬀects of the 2009 stimulus package in
the U.S. as my sample does. The eﬀect on GDP reverses around eight quarters after the shock,
eventually decreasing by around 0.18%.
Because my sign restrictions identify a simultaneous increase in net taxes and GDP as a
business cycle shock, net tax shocks are restricted to having negative eﬀects on GDP on impact
and the following four quarters. With this qualiﬁcation in mind, a 1% increase in net taxes has
a peak eﬀect of a 0.025% decrease in GDP, occurring in the quarter after the shock. The eﬀect
on GDP reverses after about 5 quarters, leading eventually to an increase of around 0.016%. In
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Figure 2: Response of foreign variables to a 1% increase in Spending
dollar terms, measured at the mean of each series, the peak eﬀect implies a net tax multiplier of
around -0.24, signiﬁcantly smaller in magnitude than the spending multiplier. This is a pattern
that continues in the responses of the other variables.
3.1.1 Spending Shocks
A spending shock has a positive spillover eﬀect on all three countries’ GDP; for Canada
the peak eﬀect is an increase of 0.29%, for Japan 0.86%, and for the U.K. 0.61%. Similar to
the response of U.S. GDP, the eﬀect on Canada’s GDP eventually turns negative, leading to a
decrease of 0.29%. Interestingly, while the eﬀect on Canada is about 60% of that for the U.S.,
the eﬀect on Japan and the U.K. is signiﬁcantly larger than for U.S. GDP, though the peaks take
three to four years to materialize.
The eﬀect on bilateral trade balances is mixed. The U.S.-Canada trade balance improves by
around 1%, and remains close to that level for the entire response horizon. The U.S.-Japan and
U.S.-U.K. balances initially decline between 1.5-2%, but both eventually improve to levels close
to 2% above where they were prior to the shock. The timing of the reversal in the Japan and
U.K. responses is consistent with the initial increase and then decrease in U.S. GDP in response
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Table 2: Responses to Government Spending shock
impact 4 qrtrs 12 qrtrs peak
Real GDP (%)
Canada 0.13 0.22 -0.18 -0.29∗ (19)
Japan 0.20 0.42 0.74∗ 0.86∗ (20)
U.K. 0.07 0.24 0.58∗ 0.61∗ (14)
Trade Balance (%)
Canada 0.85 0.71∗ 1.00∗ 1.06∗ (11)
Japan 0.80 -1.56 0.33 -2.09∗ (2)
U.K -2.00 -0.77 0.10 -2.09∗ (1)
Real Exchange Rate (%)
Canada 0.18 0.38 -0.76∗ -1.04∗ (18)
Japan 0.13 -0.36 -1.89∗ -2.63∗ (20)
U.K. 0.27 1.95∗ -0.29 2.01∗ (3)
Interest Rate Diﬀerential (basis points)
Canada -1.52 -3.65 -12.60∗ -12.85∗ (11)
Japan -1.41 -1.67 -8.30 -20.13 (20)
U.K. -1.15 -40.16∗ -26.99∗ -40.16∗ (4)
Notes: Response to a one-period, 1% increase in the level of real U.S. gov-
ernment spending per capita. An asterisk indicates that zero falls outside
90% bootstrap conﬁdence intervals. The number in parentheses is the
quarter in which the peak eﬀect occurs.
to the shock.
With Canada and the U.K. the bilateral real exchange rate appreciates for the ﬁrst eight to
ten quarters after the shock; about 0.4% for the U.S.-Canada rate and about 2% for the U.S.-U.K.
rate. Thereafter the exchange rate depreciates by about 1% and 2%, respectively, relative to its
level before the shock. For the U.S.-Japan exchange rate the depreciation happens much earlier;
after a quick appreciation of about 0.7% by the second quarter after the shock, the exchange rate
starts to depreciate, eventually decreasing by 2.63% relative to its pre-shock level.
The short-term interest rate diﬀerential decreases for all three countries, with a peak de-
crease of around 13 basis points for Canada, 20 basis points for Japan, and 40 basis points for
the U.K. While this response could be caused by either a decrease in the U.S. interest rate or an
increase in the foreign rate, it seems likely that the direct eﬀect of an increase in U.S. government
spending would fall on the U.S. rate.
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Figure 3: Response of foreign variables to a 1% increase in Net Taxes
3.1.2 Net Tax Shocks
The responses to net tax shocks are very consistent across countries. An increase in U.S.
net taxes decreases foreign GDP, improves the U.S. trade balance, causes an appreciation of the
real exchange rate, and decreases the interest rate diﬀerential. The magnitudes of the responses,
however, are much smaller than those for spending shocks and not economically signiﬁcant.
Peak eﬀects for range from 0.02% to 0.06% for GDP, from 0.04% to 0.28% for the trade balance,
from 0.17% to 0.21% for the exchange rate, and from 1 basis point to 3.4 basis points for the
interest rate diﬀerential. Moreover, for almost all of the responses, zero falls within the 90%
conﬁdence bands for most of the response horizon.
3.2 Comparison to Other Identiﬁcation Methods
In this section I compare the results generated using sign restrictions to the other identiﬁ-
cation methods discussed previously, as well as the “narrative” identiﬁcation methods of Ramey
(2011b) for government spending and Romer and Romer (2010) for taxes. The methods dis-
cussed above in Section 2.1 all share the common feature that they rely on the same measure of
total government spending or net taxes. The narrative measures instead identify shocks from
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Table 3: Responses to Net Tax shock
impact 4 qrtrs 12 qrtrs peak
Real GDP (%)
Canada 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 (2)
Japan 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 (20)
U.K -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 (3)
Trade Balance (%)
Canada 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 (1)
Japan 0.00 0.20 0.14 0.28∗ (2)
U.K 0.03 0.13 0.14 0.16 (13)
Real Exchange Rate (%)
Canada 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.17∗ (1)
Japan 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.17 (6)
U.K 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.21∗ (1)
Interest Rate Diﬀerential (basis points)
Canada 0.15 -1.24 -0.44 -2.38 (5)
Japan 0.16 0.68 -0.92 -1.07 (9)
U.K -2.23 -3.32 -0.21 -3.40 (5)
Notes: Response to a one-period, 1% increase in the level of real
U.S. net taxes per capita. An asterisk indicates that zero falls outside
90% bootstrap conﬁdence intervals. The number in parentheses is the
quarter in which the peak eﬀect occurs.
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Figure 4: Eﬀect of 1% increase in Spending.
a variable that measures news about future changes in government spending or taxes and are
intended to account for anticipation eﬀects.
For the recursive and Blanchard and Perotti identiﬁcations, the U.S. variables were ordered
government spending, net taxes, then GDP. For the Blanchard and Perotti methodology I used
the output elasticities for taxes reported in their paper to estimate a VAR using my data sample.
Figure 4 shows the results for government spending shocks and Figures 5 and 6 show the results
for net tax shocks. Since there is no reason to think that the relative diﬀerence in identiﬁcations
should vary by country, I only report results for the U.S.–Canada speciﬁcations.
From Figure 4 it is clear that the shape and persistence of the government spending shock
identiﬁed using sign restrictions is nearly identical to that identiﬁed by a recursive ordering
or the Blanchard and Perotti methodology. The responses for U.S. and Canadian GDP are
larger, and stay positive for longer, using sign restrictions, but the responses for the other three
variables are nearly identical. As a result, when shocks are identiﬁed from total government
spending it does not seem to matter much which of the methods is used. In contrast, the shock
to government spending from Ramey’s defense news variable is barely above zero on impact,
becoming negative before eventually returning to zero. It is probably for this reason that the
responses of the other variables diﬀer in direction and magnitude from those using the other
identiﬁcation methods. One possible explanation for the diﬀerence in responses here and those
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Figure 5: Eﬀect of 1% increase in Net Taxes.
found by Ramey (2011b) is the diﬀerent sample: Ramey (2011b) uses samples that range from
1939, 1947, and 1955 through 2008 while I use a sample from 1975 through 2014.
For net tax shocks, the diﬀerences across identiﬁcation methods become much starker. In
particular, the magnitude of the responses to a net tax shock are much greater when using the
recursive and Blanchard and Perotti methods than when using either sign restrictions or the
narrative approach of Romer and Romer (2010). While sign restrictions and the Romer tax
variable provide responses with similar magnitudes, the direction of the responses is mostly
diﬀerent. The diﬀerences appear to be caused by the longer persistence of tax shocks estimated
by sign restrictions than those using the Romer method. It is clear that the eﬀect of tax shocks
is sensitive to the method for identifying them; further work is needed in this area.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
The response to U.S. ﬁscal shocks is not uniform across countries or type of shock, though
some patterns emerge. Qualitatively, positive U.S. spending shocks are expansionary for Canada,
Japan, and the U.K. in the short run, though in Canada the response of GDP eventually becomes
negative. This result is consistent with the predictions of most theoretical models of ﬁscal policy
transmission. Moreover, the GDP “reversal” in Canada is consistent with the models of Betts and
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Figure 6: Eﬀect of 1% increase in Net Taxes.
Devereux (2001) and Corsetti and Müller (2013) discussed earlier (as is the reversal in the eﬀect
on U.S. GDP). Another common pattern is the negative response of the short-term interest rate
diﬀerential across countries, implying most likely a rise in the short-term U.S. real interest rate, a
ﬁnding that is not consistent with these models but is consistent with the basic Mundell-Fleming
model. The short-run response of the trade balance and the real exchange rate varies across
countries, though eventually the U.S. trade balance with all three countries improves and the
real exchange rate appreciates. The size of the responses are almost all economically signiﬁcant
and are statistically signiﬁcant over much of the response horizon.
In general the response to net tax shocks is much smaller — often an order of magnitude
— than the response to government spending shocks. My results were neither statistically nor
economically signiﬁcant.
None of the theoretical models discussed above is consistent with all of the results presented
for any of the countries individually, and, given the diﬀerent results across countries it seems that
no single model may be able to explain the transmission of U.S. ﬁscal policy with respect to each
of its trading partners. Identifying which aspects of each bilateral relationship are signiﬁcant
for transmission is an important question raised by my results and suggests an avenue for future
research.
While this paper made use of an identiﬁcation method for ﬁscal shocks that has concep-
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tual beneﬁts over other common identiﬁcation methods, when government spending shocks are
identiﬁed from total government spending in a VAR each of the identiﬁcation methods discussed
produces similar results. For net tax shocks the identiﬁcation method matters, particularly for
the magnitude of the responses.
To return to the question posed in the Introduction, should policy makers worry that ﬁscal
stimulus measures may beneﬁt their trading partners? My results suggest that the answer is
yes. In many countries political support for ﬁscal stimulus has declined in recent years, par-
ticularly for programs that involve increased government spending and despite tepid recoveries
or continued recession. While tax cuts may be more politically palatable — and have small
spillover eﬀects according to my results — their domestic eﬀects are smaller too. So the worry is
even more relevant now than it was in 2008. This suggests that international coordination may
be even more important in the future for generating support for ﬁscal responses to economic
downturns.
Appendix A: Generating Candidate Responses
To generate candidate sets of impulse responses it is useful to note that there is an arbitrarily
large number of matrices for which BB′ = Σ̂u. As Fry and Pagan (2007) emphasize, each of
these matrices represents a separate structural model, all of which are observationally equivalent
in the sense that they produce residuals with the same covariance structure. To generate each set
of impulse responses, I start with the Cholesky factorization (P ) and multiply by an orthonormal
matrix Q which has the property that Q′Q = QQ′ = I . Accordingly, PQQ′P ′ = Σ̂u. The sign
restrictions I impose are restrictions on the responses of the ﬁrst three variables in the VAR
(government spending, gt, net taxes, tt, and U.S. GDP, yt, respectively). The matrix Q that I
construct therefore makes use of a Givens rotation in three dimensions. Speciﬁcally, for each set
of candidate responses I draw (θ1, θ2, θ3) from a uniform distribution on [0, pi] and calculate
Q3 =
 cos(θ1) − sin(θ1) 0sin(θ1) cos(θ1) 0
0 0 1
×
 cos(θ2) 0 − sin(θ2)0 1 0
sin(θ2) 0 cos(θ2)
×
 1 0 00 cos(θ3) − sin(θ3)
0 sin(θ3) cos(θ3)
 ,
where Q3 is the upper left 3 × 3 section of Q. The rest of Q consists of ones on the diagonal
and zeros everywhere else.
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Appendix B: Data
Data for the U.S. variables is from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). Bilateral trade data are from the BEA’s International
Transactions Accounts. Foreign data is from the International Monetary Fund’s International
Financial Statistics Database. U.S. NIPA and IMF data are seasonally adjusted by the source.
The international trade data were seasonally adjusted by me using the U.S. Census Bureau’s
X12-ARIMA.7
U.S. real net taxes are from NIPA Table 3.1 and calculated as the sum of Current Tax Receipts
(line 2), Contributions for Government Social Insurance (line 7) and Current Transfer Receipts
(line 13) minus the sum of Current Transfer Payments (line 19), Interest Payments (line 24) and
Subsidies (line 27). Interest rate diﬀerentials are calculated as the U.S. rate minus the foreign
rate. Ex-post real interest rates are calculated by subtracting the quarterly CPI inﬂation rate.
The real bilateral exchange rate is calculated as:
Nominal Exchange Rate (units of foreign / $ U.S.) × US CPI
Foreign CPI
.
The trade balance is calculated as the log ratio of exports to imports. The Ramey defense
news variable was downloaded from Valerie Ramey’s website and the Romer tax variable was
downloaded from David Romer’s website.
7This was done using the IRIS Toolbox for Matlab. http://www.iris-toolbox.com
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